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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
statutory revision, passed by a single act of the legislature. The
Criminal Code of 1942"' was passed by a single act, and its validity
upheld by the supreme court."5 Decisions of other states have simi-
larly upheld the passage of codes, dealing with particular fields of
substantive law, under one title."6
Despite that fact and although the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "object" refers to the aim or purpose of the statute, and has
adopted the liberal approach to the application of the constitutional
prohibition, a revision of statutes necessarily covers a multitude of
various and diverse subjects; whether or not a single statute would
be sufficient to take all such diverse fields into its fold is very
doubtful. In any event, the passage of the Revised Statutes as a
single statute with one title would raise immediately the question of
validity. Special steps will probably be taken to safeguard against
this contingency. In this regard, several possibilities present them-
selves: (1) to adopt a constitutional amendment, and pass the
revision as an enabling act or a provision in the proposed new con-
stitution which would specifically provide for the adoption of a
general statutory revision, or (2) to pass the revision piece-meal, title
by title-a long and cumbersome process.
Whatever steps are taken, it appears that to place the passage
of the revision beyond grave legal uncertainties, such action may
well be necessary. It would seem that for the first time the "title-
body" clause presents a stumbling block of a sort not easily brushed
aside by judicial determinations and distinctions.
GORDON KEAN
OWNERSHIP OF AIRSPACE IN LOUISIANA
"Article 505.' The ownership of the soil carries with it the
ownership of all that is directly above and under it.
"The owner may make upon it all the plantations and erect
all the buildings which he thinks proper, under the exceptions
established in the title: OF SERVITUDES.
34. La. Act 43 of 1942.
35. State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2d) 868 (1944).
36. State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375 (1903), upholding the validity
of the Washington State Penal Code; Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. State,
104 Ga. 831, 81 S. E. 581 (1898), declaring valid a code of substantive law, similar
to the Revised Civil Code of 1870; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W.
923 (1891), upholding validity of the Minnesota Probate Code.
1. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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"He may construct below the soil all manner of works, dig-
ging as deep as he deems convenient, and draw from them all
the benefits which may accrue, under such modifications as may
result from the laws and regulations concerning mines and the
laws and regulations of the police."
This property right in the space above land is a general prin-
ciple with many corollaries.2 The cases leave little doubt that the doc-
trine will be applied to give to the surface owner the ownership of
that space near the surface which he actually uses? A more difficult
problem, which has not yet arisen in Louisiana, but which has been
frequently presented in other jurisdictions, appeared with the ad-
vent of aviation.' Literal application of the principle of infinite up-
ward extent of ownership would give the surface owner a cause of
action against all who might enter the space above his land. Ob-
viously no modern authority advocates unqualified application of
such a rule, because this would practically prohibit all flight and
stop the development of aviation, which has become an indispen-
sable part of modern civilization.5
POSSIBLE THEORIES UNDER PRESENT LOUISIANA LAw
Under the present law in Louisiana, a number of possible solu-
tions would be available. Discussion and evaluation of some of these
2. For example, the presumption that the owner of the soil owns all struc-
tures thereon (Art. 506); the right of the owner of the soil to retain buildings
which he built with the materials of another (Art. 507); the right of the owner
of the soil to keep improvements placed thereon by third persons (Art. 508);
the right to demand removal of overhanging branches (Art. 691); and the prohi-
bition against building structures which project over boundaries (Arts. 678, 697).
For a discussion of accession see Symposium, The Work of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court for the 1939-1940 Term (1941) 8 LouiSIANA LAw REvIEw 280.
3. Miller v. Michaud, 11 Rob. 225, 228-229 (La. 1845) (lessee may not alienate
or mortgage buildings built by him on land of lessor); Mullen v. Follain, 12 La.
Ann. 838 (1857) (grantee of land has title to buildings thereon whether described
in the conveyance or not); Whiteman v. LeBlanc, 28 La. Ann. 430, 482 (1876)
(creditor of community between spouses may not have seized and sold buildings
erected by the community on land owned separately by one spouse); New Or-
leans National Bank v. Raymond, 29 La. Ann. 855 (1877) (a mortgage of land
extends to undescribed structures thereon); Johnson v. Weinstock, 81 La. Ann.
698, 701 (1879) (the owner of land owns buildings erected thereon by another)
[Accord: Atkins v. Smith, 207 La. 560, 568, 21 So. (2d) 728, 780 (1945)] ; Good-
win v. Alexander, 105 La. 658, 660, 30 So. 102, 103 (1901) (a servitude of prohibi-
tion to build can be established only by title) [Accord: Ribet v. Howard, 109
La. 113, 116, 33 So. 103, 104 (1902); Bernos v. Canepa, 114 La. 517, 520, 88 So.
438, 440 (1905)] ; Cascio v. Depaula, 27 So. (2d) 453, 455 (La. App. 1946) (title
to buildings placed on land by a grantee reverts to the grantor with the land on
the happening of a resolutory condition).
4. See Tiffany, A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other
Interests in Land (Zollman ed. 1940) 394 et seq., § 400.
5. Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 86.
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is the aim of this comment. Under existing legislation at least three
theories may be considered.
Literal construction of Article 5056
If the first paragraph of Article 505 were applied literally, the
ownership of space at any height would vest in the owner of the soil
directly below it. This ownership would embrace all the customary
rights and privileges of ownership, including the right to prevent
invasion by others;7 thus, entry by any aircraft at any height would
be trespass, unless permitted in the exercise of a conventional servi-
tude,8 or of an "easement" (in immediate vicinity of airports) estab-
lished by eminent domain proceedings under a special statute.9
The unqualified application of this "ad coelum" theory seems
hardly justified by its history. ° The principle that the ownership of
land embraces the ownership of the space above it is of doubtful
origin. Although analogous to the Roman principles of accession, it
is not expressly stated in Corpus Juris Civilis, and it has been attrib-
uted to a gloss of Accursius in the Thirteenth Century." The prin-
ciple became settled in the Comman Law of England; " and, after
its incorporation in the French Civil Code of 1804," it came to be
expressed in the codes of many civil law jurisdictions, including
Louisiana. 4 Its root, therefore, is not Roman but medieval law,
6. La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. Art. 68, La. Crim. Code of 1942, denounces "... (2) the unauthorized
and intentional entry upon any: (a) Enclosed and posted plot of ground; or
(b) Posted lands belonging to public institutions. . . ." If Article 505 is to be
strictly construed, one who deliberately flew over posted lands would be crim-
inally liable. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nevin and Smith, Court of Quarter Sessions
of Jefferson County, Pennsylvania (unreported, 1922) noted in (1922) 71 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 88, in which the court refused to impose criminal liability for flight
over posted lands, and dicta in Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Campb. 219, 171 Eng. Rep.
70 (1815), indicating that a flight over private land in a balloon was not civil
trespass.
8. Arts. 709, 722, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. La. Act 118 of 1944, § 10.
10. See Zollman, Law of the Air (1927) 6-11, §§ 10-13.
11. Bouvd, Private Ownership of Airspace (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 232, 248
et seq., gives a detailed discussion of possible sources of the ad coolum doctrine,
giving the most plausible source as the Accursian gloss (Dig. viii.2.lpr.) in the
form of cujuo colum ejus eseo debet usque ad coelum. The adoption of the prin'-
ciple as a maxim of English common law is attributed to the fact that Franciscus(d. 1298), son of Accursius (1182-1260), was a lecturer at Oxford and an advisor
to Edward I.
12. ". . . and lastly, the earth bath in law a great extent upwards, not only
of water, as bath been said, but of ayre and all other things even up to heaven,
for oujus est solum ejus est usquO ad coolum, as is holden in 14 H. 8. fo. 12.
22 Hen. 6.59. 10 E. 4.14. Registrum origin, and In other books." Coke on Littleton
4a.
13. Art. 552, French Civil Code.
14. Compare Art. 552, French Civil Code, with Art. 505, La. Civil Code of
1870; Art. 2518, C6digo Civil de la Repfiblica Argentina (J. Lajouane y Cia,
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which applied the ad coelum maxim to implement decisions involv-
ing things near the surface of the earth. In an age when the owner-
ship of great heights was of no concern, this generalization was in-
corporated into our law for use in the solution of problems alto-
gether different from that presented by modern conflicts between
landowner and aeronaut."
One purpose which would be accomplished by the "ad coelum"
theory is expressed by the German writer, Theodor Kipp."6 He states
that its principal value would be in making it a civil wrong to cross
private land, thereby providing the "fault" element upon which to
predicate tort recovery in case of damage to the property below. Thus
the landowner might recover irrespective of actual negligence on the
part of the aeronaut. But Kipp considers this unnecessary since lia-
bility without fault may readily be imposed under a German theory
similar to the ultra-hazardous activity doctrine of the American
courts. In this manner, the landowner would be fully protected
against actual injury without prohibiting aerial navigation.
Even if the literal construction of Article 505 were justifiable
from a theoretical viewpoint, there are such strong reasons of public
policy to oppose its use that no one could seriously advocate its adop-
don. It is clear that a balance or adjustment of interests must be
reached, that is, a doctrine which will permit reasonable use of the
air while protecting the legitimate interests of the landowner.
Interpretation of Article 450 to mean that airspace is a "common
thing"
This article, found in the section of the code dealing with gen-
eral principles of the division of things, provides:
"Thifigs, which are common, are those the ownership of
which belongs to nobody in particular, and which all men may
freely use, conformably with the use for which nature has in-
1939); Art. 297, C6dlgo Civil Boliviano (Castillo, 1939); Art. 440, Codlce Civile
del Regno d'Italia (Barbera, 1918); Art. 892, C6digo Civil de Ia Repdblica de
Guatemala (1987); Art. 457, Code Civil d'Haiti (Leger, 1931); Art. 414, Petit
Code Civil Annot6 de la Province de Quebec (Durantaye, 1937); Art. 748, C6digo
Civil de ]a Repdblica Oriental del Uruguay (1914); 1 Villafafla, Loreto y Zacars,
Compilact6n Legislativa de Venezuela, Codigo Civil, Art. 527.
15. See Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173. S. E. 817 (1984), in which
the court reasoned that, since early cases actually involved only that space
susceptible of possession, all statements as to ownership beyond the limits of
potential possession were necessarily obiter dicta and could be freely disregarded
by the courts.
16. Kipp, Luftschiffahrt und Grundeigentum, Sonderabdruck aus der Juris-
tischen Wochensehrift, 1908 Nr. 19.
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tended them; such as air, running water, the sea and its shores."17
As a common thing, air would be insusceptible of private ownership.
It could not, therefore, be embraced within the terms of Article 505,
which includes only those things "directly above" the soil which are
susceptible of private ownership. Accordingly, the space would be
free to all for aerial navigation.
The conclusion reached by the Spanish commentator Valverde,1
that airspace is common, was based upon the following reasons: (1)
all private rights are subordinate to public interest, (2) airspace is
not susceptible of possession, and (3) airspace is not a "thing" within
the sense of the law.
Though public policy might justify classification of airspace as
a common thing, this theory does not find support in the Roman law
from which Article 450 was derived.' The Roman law did not con-
fuse "air" with the space which it occupied, and the word "air" in
the enumeration of common things has reference to the mixture of
gases which surrounds the earth, that is, "air for breathing." When
space is referred to in Roman law other words are used, and no-
where is "space" classified as a common thing.20
Classification of airspace as a common thing would effect a
result similar to that reached in a number of common law jurisdic-
tions by means of the "actual use" and "nuisance" theories. The
former limits ownership of airspace to that space actually in use;"
the latter denies all recovery for trespass but permits recovery for
nuisance or negligence in cases of actual interference with the right
of the owner to enjoy his land. 2 In like manner, if the provisions of
Article 450 were interpreted to include airspace, the owner could
have no remedy for a technical invasion of space above his land, but
17. La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. 2 Valverde, Tratado de derecho civil espaflol, 79-81.
19. Compare Art. 450, La. Civil Code of 1870, with Inst. 1.2.1.1: "Things
common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea,
and consequently the shores of the sea. ....'
20. "When airspace is discussed in the Sources the word 'air' is not used,
but other expressions such as Aeris epatium (airspace), 8patium (space), coelum
(sky). The word 'air' in the sense of 'airspace' has been found but once ...
Also, another thing is certain: when the sources speak of 'airspace' they never
say that airspace Is 'a thing common to all.' So it is concluded that the Sources
do not say that airspace at any altitude is subject to public control, or that it is
left to the free use of everybody." Lardone, Airspace Rights in Roman Law
(1931) 2 Air L. Rev. 455, 461, 462.
21. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C A. 9th, 1936).
22. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201, 83 A. L. R. 819
(C. C. A. 6th, 1982).
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would retain his remedies of tort, including nuisance, in case of
actual damage or interference with his right of enjoyment.
Limitation of Article 505 to space utilizable for planting and building
Article 505 of the Louisiana Civil Code is almost identical with
Article 552 of the French Civil Code.2" In 1912, a French landowner
brought an action against a school of aviation whose planes had
caused damage in flying over his land. The court permitted recovery
of actual damage suffered, but refused to consider possible future
damage or to prohibit flight: over the land.24 Less than a year later,
ownership of upper space was considered in a unique situation. The
activities of an airdrome from which dirigibles frequently crossed his
land so annoyed a landowner that he purchased additional land near
the hangar and erected a wooden tower on which he mounted iron
rods, sharp-pointed and long, for the purpose of damaging low fly-
ing dirigibles. He was held liable.25
In a note to the latter decision, Louis Josserand made a careful
analysis of the limitations of private ownership of airspace.-" The
limitations, said Josserand, were of two kinds--quantitative and
qualitative. The quantitative limitation was analogous to national
sovereignty over territorial waters, which at that time had been ex-
tended to a distance based on the range of control by shore batteries
of artillery, whereas beyond that range there was freedom of the sea.
23. Art. 552, French Civil Code: "La propri~td du aol emporto la propriWd
du deseus ot diu dessoua.
"La propri4taire peut faire au-deassus toutes les plantations et constructions
qu'il juge a propos, aauf le8 eaceptions dtablies au titre 'Des servitudes ou serv-
ices fonciers.'
"Ii peut faire au dessous toutes lea constructions et fouilles qts'il Jugera a
propo8, et tirer de ce8 fouille8 toua lea produits qu'ellea peuvent fournir, sauf las
modifications rdaultant des lois et r49lement8 relatifa aux mines, et des lois et
rbglements do police."
(Translation) Ownership of the land carries with it ownership of what is
above and below It.
An owner can make upon it all the plantations and constructions which he
deems proper, with the exceptions specified in the title "Of Seorvitudes or Land
Burdens."
He can make below all constructions and excavations which he deems proper
and draw from these excavations all the products which they may give, subject
to the restrictions resulting from the laws or the regulations relating to mines,
or from police laws and regulations.
24. Bertrand, Brinquant et Mauge c. Socit6 Farman, Trib. civ. de la Seine,
6 juill. 1912, D.1913.2.117. For a criticism see Demogue, Obligations et contrats
sp~ciaux (France, 1912) 11 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 785, no 1.
25. Clement-Bayard c. Coquerel, Trib. civ. de Compikgne, 19 fdvr. 1913,
D.1913.2.181. Discussed in Demogue, Obligations et contrats spiaux (France,
1913) 12 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 804, no 9.
.26. Note by Josserand, D.1918.2.177, at 178. Compare 8 Planiol et Ripert,
Traitd pratique de droit civil frangais (1926) 246, no 252; 1 Colin et Capitant,
Cours 0l nmentalre de droit civil fran;ais (8 ed. 1934) 741, no 698.
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In like manner, he reasoned, there must be a limitation of the pri-
vate domain over airspace. In reaching that limitation, the intent of
the legislature must be considered. It was apparent that the prin-
ciple of upward ownership had been included in the code with a
view to the landowner's rights as defined in the second paragraph of
the article-to make upon the land all the plantations and construc-
tions which he thought proper. Therefore the legislature only in-
tended to guarantee the right to plant and to build, and had no
intention of extending private ownership to the heavens. Josserand's
qualitative limitation would prohibit the malicious use of the land
by the landowner with intent to damage aircraft, as was done in the
case which he discusses. What Josserand would call a "qualitative
limitation" is also expressed in the writings of Baudry-Lacantinerie, T
who would prohibit any abuse by the landowner of his rights--"any
measure tending only to hinder, without usefulness to himself, the
aerial circulation over his estate." In this connection it is well to note
a provision of the Louisiana Civil Code which is based on Spanish
law:" "Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his
neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the
cause of any damage to him." 9
Josserand's reasoning was paralleled in another French case in
1914 which involved injury to a landowner by flights from a flying
school. The court limited recovery to actual damages sustained, de-
claring that ownership of upward space was limited to the height
susceptible of utilization for constructions or plantations, and that
beyond this height there was complete freedom of the air."° An
almost identical result has been reached by some American courts
under what the text writers call the "zone theory," which limits
ownership to possible effective possession.8'
Ownership of upward space has been expressly limited in a
number of foreign civil codes to produce the same result. Among
these are the Swiss Civil Code, 2 which extends ownership "into the
air and the earth so far as the exercise of ownership requires"; the
27. Baudry-Lacantinerie, Precis de droit civil (14 ed. 1926) 622, no 1.
28. Part. 8.28.42.
29. Art. 667, La. Civil Code of 1870.
80. Heurtebise c. Farman freres, Esnault-Pelterie et Socit6 Borel, Trib.
civ. de la Seine, 10 juin 1914, D.1914.2.193. Discussed in Demogue, Obligations
et contrats sp~ciaux (France, 1914) 14 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 166, no 1.
81. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 885, 69
A.L.R. 800 (1930).
82. Art. 667, Swiss Civil Code (Shick, 1907).
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Civil Code of Honduras,83 which extends it to the altitude required
by the landowner's interest in relation to his use of the land; and
the Civil Code of Peru, 4 which places the limit "where the exercise
of his right may be useful to the proprietor." Also worthy of con-
sideration at this point are the Civil Codes of Spain85 and jurisdic-
tions closely following Spanish law, such as Cuba," Puerto Rico, 7
Nicaragua, 8 Panama39 and the Philippine Islands ° The text of the
pertinent article of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico is typical of all
these:
"Section 284. The owner of a parcel of ground is the owner
of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations
which he may deem proper, without detriment to the servi-
tudes legally established thereon."
The omission of the usual statement regarding ownership of upward
space is significant. Under such an article, it would seem that the
interpretation worked out in the French cases previously discussed-
that the air was free above the height utilizable for planting and
building-would be a logical development.
SPECIAL STATUTES IN OTHR JURISDICTIONS
A number of jurisdictions, realizing the inadequacy of their
existing legislation and legal principles, have met the problem with
special statutes. In the United States the most common is the Uni-
form Aeronautics Law4' which declares that the ownership of space.
is vested in the owners of the surface below, but subject to a right
of flight in the manner prescribed by the statute. The result reached
38. Art. 614, Repdblica de Honduras, C6digo Civil (1906).
84. 1 Perd, C6digo Civil (1940) Art. 854.
35. Art. 350, C6digo Civil Espafiol (Manresa, 1934). Manresa takes the view
that this article could logically be interpreted to give the limited ownership effect
of the Swiss Code (see note 32, supra).
36. Art. 850, C6digo Civil Vigente en Cuba (Roca, 1941).
37. Art. 284, Civil Code of Puerto Rico (official ed. 1930).
88. Art. 618, C6digo Civil de la Reptiblica de Nicaragua (8d official ed.,
1931).
39. Art. 339, Repilblica de Panamd, C6digo Civil (official ed. 1917).
40. Art. 350, Civil Code, Philippine Islands (Sinco and Capistrano, 1932).
41. 11 Uniform Laws Annotated (1938 ed.) 159 et seq. This statute has
been adopted in twenty-one states and Hawaii. Section 3 provides: "The owner-
ship of the space above the lands and waters of this State is declared to be
vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight
described in Section 4."
1947]
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is very similar to the result under the Restatement of Torts theory
of privileged invasion of privately owned space."
Similarly a number of modern civil codes in foreign jurisdic-
tions incorporate the general principle of upward ownership of space
but add a statement of qualification. For example, in Germany "the
owner may not, however, forbid interference which takes place at
such a height or depth that he has no interest in its prevention."43 In
China "interference by others cannot be excluded if it does not ob-
struct the exercise of the ownership."" In Brazil "the owner can-
not, however, prevent works which may be undertaken, at such a
height or depth that he has no interest in preventing them."4
Other statutes have been adopted in various parts of the world.
For example, in 1924 the French adopted a statute which is predi-
cated on the principle of freedom of flight, but provides that the
right of flight may not be exercised so as to hinder the exercise of
the rights of the landowner.4" The effect of this statute has been said
to create on all land in France a legal servitude in the public inter-
est.47 In Brazil "the right to fly over private property must not inter-
fere with the owner's enjoyment of his land; but on the other hand,
the owner of land cannot detain a plane that has been forced down
on his property except in exercising the right of arrest, whereby the
plane is retained as security for some property right."4 The English
Air Navigation Act 9 provides that "no action shall lie in respect of
trespass or in respect of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of air-
craft over any property."
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the law cannot recognize private ownership
of airspace in such a manner that its exercise might prevent reason-
able aerial navigation. For this reason there are but two alternatives:
either a denial of private ownership of navigable airspace subject to
42. Section 158 provides that an actionable trespass may occur above the
surface of the earth, but Section 194 gives a privilege of entry to persons travel-
ling in air craft in the manner authorized.
43. German Civil Code (Chung Hui Wang, 1907) §905.
44. Art. 773, Civil Code of the Republic of China (English transl. 1981).
45. Art. 526, Civil Code of Brazil (Wheless, 1920).
46. Loi du 81 mal 1924, Sirey, Lois annotdes, 1924-1925, p. 1559; Dalloz,
Bulletin legislatif, ann6e 1924, p. 378.
47. 8 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 pratique de droit civil franqais (1926) 246,
no 252.
48. Marchant, Aviation in Brazil (1989) 10 Air L. Rev. 44, 59, citing decree-
law 488 of June 8, 1938, Arts. 8, 61-66.
49. 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 80, s. 9(1) (1920), as amended by 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw.
8, c. 44, s. 28, scheds. V., VII (1936).
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the landowner's primary and exclusive right to use by occupying all
he needs, or a declaration that though privately owned, the airspace
is subject to a right of flight in a reasonable manner. The latter solu-
tion would give the flier a right partaking of the nature of a servi-
tude. In the absence of specific legislation to that effect, this seems
inconsistent with the general provision of law that discontinuous
non-apparent servitudes can be established only by title."0 Therefore,
the former seems to be the preferable basis for solution, namely, that
navigable airspace is insusceptible of private ownership.
In order to reach this conclusion, Article 505 would have to pro-
vide that the surface owner does not have title to the upper regions,
but may yet control that part of the space above his land which is
necessary for the enjoyment of his rights of ownership. This result
is reached by the French interpretation of its corresponding article;
and the same might be followed without difficulty in Louisiana. An
even more direct approach, which would clarify the issue more com-
pletely, would be the revision of the first paragraph of Article 505 so
as to limit the extent of ownership into upward space, as do the
codes of Switzerland, Honduras and Peru, all previously discussed."
Once the limits of private ownership have been defined, it re-
mains to determine the classification of the remaining space, in
which there is freedom of the air, subject to appropriate regulatory
restrictions by the sovereign but free from interference by the sur-
face owner. The logical classification of these airways would seem
to be with the other two great media of transportation available for
general use-highways and waterways, which are "public things"
specifically provided for in Article 453.52 Since the language of that
article indicates that its enumeration of public things is illustrative
rather than exclusive, navigable airspace would seem to come logic-
ally within the classification of "things ... the use of which is al-
lowed to all the members of the nation."
The absence of any legislative or judicial consideration of this
question in Louisiana makes any conclusion essentially speculative.
50. Art. 766, La. Civil Code of 1870.
51. See notes 32-34, supra.
52. La. Civil Code of 1870. This article provides: "Public things are those,
the property of which is vested in a whole nation, and the use of which is allowed
to all the members of the nation: of this kind are navigable rivers, seaports, road-
steads and harbors, highways and the beds of rivers, as long as the same are
covered with water.
"Hence it follows that every man has a right freely to fish in the rivers,
ports, roadsteads, and harbors."
1947]
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With this reservation it is concluded:
1. That present day conditions require freedom of aerial naviga-
tion from interference by landowners who have suffered no real
injury;
2. That the provision of Article 505 must be interpreted or
amended so as to restrict private ownership of airspace to limits con-
sistent with the requirements of a full enjoyment of the property in
a reasonable manner;
3. That ownership of the airspace beyond this limit is vested in
the public, and its use for aerial navigation is free to all, subject only
to a requirement of reasonableness and conformance with statutory
regulations.
ROBERT E. EATmAN
